Fixed proxy user/password buffer overflow
By using a dedicated buffer for sending the username and password for the SOCKS5 proxy, there will be no overflow when copying them to the buffer. And therefore, RFC 1929 is fully supported.
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parent
37192a9136
commit
7b950eb021
@ -1116,6 +1116,7 @@ traverse_socks5 (int print_fd, int sok, char *serverAddr, int port)
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if (auth)
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{
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int len_u=0, len_p=0;
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unsigned char *u_p_buf;
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/* authentication sub-negotiation (RFC1929) */
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if (buf[1] != 2) /* UPA not supported by server */
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@ -1124,18 +1125,22 @@ traverse_socks5 (int print_fd, int sok, char *serverAddr, int port)
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return 1;
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}
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memset (buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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/* form the UPA request */
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len_u = strlen (prefs.hex_net_proxy_user);
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len_p = strlen (prefs.hex_net_proxy_pass);
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buf[0] = 1;
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buf[1] = len_u;
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memcpy (buf + 2, prefs.hex_net_proxy_user, len_u);
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buf[2 + len_u] = len_p;
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memcpy (buf + 3 + len_u, prefs.hex_net_proxy_pass, len_p);
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send (sok, buf, 3 + len_u + len_p, 0);
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packetlen = 2 + len_u + 1 + len_p;
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u_p_buf = g_malloc0 (packetlen);
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u_p_buf[0] = 1;
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u_p_buf[1] = len_u;
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memcpy (u_p_buf + 2, prefs.hex_net_proxy_user, len_u);
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u_p_buf[2 + len_u] = len_p;
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memcpy (u_p_buf + 3 + len_u, prefs.hex_net_proxy_pass, len_p);
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send (sok, u_p_buf, packetlen, 0);
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g_free(u_p_buf);
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if ( recv (sok, buf, 2, 0) != 2 )
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goto read_error;
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if ( buf[1] != 0 )
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