mirror of
https://github.com/Tygs/0bin.git
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87 lines
3.6 KiB
Plaintext
87 lines
3.6 KiB
Plaintext
============
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Introduction
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============
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0bin allows anybody to host a pastebin while welcoming any type of content to
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be pasted in it. The idea is that one can (probably...) not be legally entitled
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to `moderate the pastebin content`_ as he/she has no way to decrypt it.
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It's an Python implementation of the
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`zerobin project`_. It's easy to
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install even if you know nothing about Python.
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How it works
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=============
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When creating the paste:
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- the browser generate a random key;
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- the pasted content is encrypted with this key using AES256;
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- the encrypted pasted content is sent to the server;
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- the browser receives the paste URL and add the key in the URL hash (#).
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When reading the paste:
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- the browser makes the GET request to the paste URL;
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- because the key is in the hash, the key is not part of the request;
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- browser gets the encrypted content et decrypt it using the key;
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- the pasted decrypted content is displayed and code is colored.
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Key points:
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- because the key is in the hash, the key is never sent to the server;
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- therefor it won't appear in the server logs;
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- all operations, including code coloration, must happens on the client;
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- the server is no more than a fancy recipient for the encrypted data.
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Other features
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======================
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- automatic code coloration (no need to specify);
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- pastebin expiration: 1 day, 1 month or never;
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- burn after reading: the paste is destroyed after the first reading;
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- clone paste: you can't edit a paste, but you can duplicate any of them;
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- code upload: if a file is too big, you can upload it instead of using copy/paste;
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- copy paste to clipboard in a click;
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- get paste short URL in a click;
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- own previous pastes history;
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- visual hash of a paste to easily tell it appart from others in a list.
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Technologies used
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==================
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- Python_
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- `The Bottle Python Web microframework`_
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- SJCL_ (js crypto tools)
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- jQuery_
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- Bootstrap_, the Twitter HTML5/CSS3 framework
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- VizHash.js_ to create visual hashes from pastes
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- Cherrypy_ (server only)
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Known issues
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============
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- 0bin uses several HTML5/CSS3 features that are not widely supported. In that case we handle the degradation as gracefully as we can.
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- The "copy to clipboard" feature is buggy under linux. It's flash, so we won't fix it. Better wait for the HTML5 clipboard API to be implemented in major browsers.
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- The pasted content size limit check is not accurate. It's just a safety net, so we thinks it's ok.
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- Some url shorteners and other services storing URLs break the encryption key. We will sanitize the URL as much as we can, but there is a limit to what we can do.
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What does 0bin not implement?
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=================================
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* Request throttling. It would be inefficient to do it at the app level, and web servers have robust implementations for it.
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* Hash collision prevention: the ratio "probability it happens/consequence seriousness" `is not worth it`_
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* Comments: it was initially planed. But comes with a lot of issues so we chose to focus on lower handing fruits.
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.. _moderate the pastebin content: http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/pastebin-to-hunt-for-hacker-pastes-anonymous-cries-censorship/11336
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.. _zerobin project: https://github.com/sebsauvage/ZeroBin/
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.. _Python: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Python_(programming_language)
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.. _The Bottle Python Web microframework: http://bottlepy.org/
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.. _SJCL: http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/
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.. _jQuery: http://jquery.com/
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.. _Bootstrap: http://twitter.github.com/bootstrap/
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.. _VizHash.js: https://github.com/sametmax/VizHash.js
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.. _Cherrypy: http://www.cherrypy.org/ (server only)
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.. _is not worth it: http://stackoverflow.com/questions/201705/how-many-random-elements-before-md5-produces-collisions |