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v/thirdparty/mbedtls/library/ssl_tls12_client.c

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net.ssl: switch to mbedtls over openssl (#15841)
2022-09-22 16:50:34 +03:00
/*
* TLS client-side functions
*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include "common.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "ssl_client.h"
#include "ssl_misc.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#include <string.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
{
if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) )
return( 1 );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
return( 1 );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
*olen = 0;
/* We're always including an TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
* initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
* info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len );
/*
* Secure renegotiation
*/
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 );
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len );
memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
*olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
(void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */
*olen = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 2;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
*olen = 6;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t kkpp_len;
*olen = 0;
/* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 );
p += 2;
/*
* We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification.
* We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance
* and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content.
*/
if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ||
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) );
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 ,
"mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len );
if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len );
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) );
kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len );
memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len );
}
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*olen = kkpp_len + 4;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t ext_len;
/*
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
*
* struct {
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
* } ConnectionId;
*/
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) );
/* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
* which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) );
/* Add extension ID + size */
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 );
p += 2;
ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
*olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 1;
*p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code;
*olen = 5;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*p++ = 0x00;
*p++ = 0x00;
*olen = 4;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
*olen = 0;
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
/* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, p, 0 );
p += 2;
*olen = 4;
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
return( 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) );
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
*olen += tlen;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *olen )
{
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0;
uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0;
*olen = 0;
if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
{
return( 0 );
}
/* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
* uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
*
* struct {
* SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
* opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
* } UseSRTPData;
* SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
*/
if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
{
mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
}
/* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length,
* ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ),
* 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value
*/
ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) );
/* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes
* - the extension tag (2 bytes)
* - the extension length (2 bytes)
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0 );
p += 2;
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
p += 2;
/* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */
/* micro-optimization:
* the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH
* which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0
* For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments
* *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len )
* >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*/
*p++ = 0;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len );
for( protection_profiles_index=0;
protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len;
protection_profiles_index++ )
{
profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] );
if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x",
profile_value ) );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, p, 0 );
p += 2;
}
else
{
/*
* Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles
* is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "client hello, "
"illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d",
ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]
) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
}
}
*p++ = mki_len & 0xFF;
if( mki_len != 0 )
{
memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len );
/*
* Increment p to point to the current position.
*/
p += mki_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
}
/*
* total extension length: extension type (2 bytes)
* + extension length (2 bytes)
* + protection profile length (2 bytes)
* + 2 * number of protection profiles
* + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte)
* + mki value
*/
*olen = p - buf;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
int uses_ec,
size_t *out_len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *p = buf;
size_t ext_len = 0;
(void) ssl;
(void) end;
(void) uses_ec;
(void) ret;
(void) ext_len;
*out_len = 0;
/* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added
* even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( uses_ec )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p, end,
&ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p, end,
&ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p, end, &ext_len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret );
return( ret );
}
p += ext_len;
#endif
*out_len = p - buf;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
{
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1,
ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
{
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
}
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
/*
* server should use the extension only if we did,
* and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1)
*/
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ||
len != 1 ||
buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t peer_cid_len;
if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
/* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
}
if( len == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
peer_cid_len = *buf++;
len--;
if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
if( len != peer_cid_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
len != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
}
((void) buf);
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
size_t list_size;
const unsigned char *p;
if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
list_size = buf[0];
p = buf + 1;
while( list_size > 0 )
{
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED )
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
( defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) )
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
( MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
mbedtls_ecjpake_set_point_format( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p[0] );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
return( 0 );
}
list_size--;
p++;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
return( 0 );
}
/* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache );
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
{
size_t list_len, name_len;
const char **p;
/* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION );
}
/*
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
*
* struct {
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
* } ProtocolNameList;
*
* the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
*/
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
if( len < 4 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
if( list_len != len - 2 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
name_len = buf[2];
if( name_len != list_len - 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
{
if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
{
ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
return( 0 );
}
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len )
{
mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
size_t i, mki_len = 0;
uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0;
/* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
return( 0 );
/* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
* uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
*
* struct {
* SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
* opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
* } UseSRTPData;
* SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
*
*/
if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
{
mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
}
/*
* Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes)
* + protection profile (2 bytes)
* + mki_len(1 byte)
* and optional srtp_mki
*/
if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
/*
* get the server protection profile
*/
/*
* protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only
* one protection profile in server Hello
*/
if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3];
server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
server_protection_profile_value );
if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
server_protection ) ) );
}
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
/*
* Check we have the server profile in our list
*/
for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++)
{
if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] )
{
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s",
mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
server_protection ) ) );
break;
}
}
/* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */
if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
/* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep
* one as negotiated */
if( len == 5 )
{
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0;
}
/*
* RFC5764:
* If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response
* that is different than the one the client offered, then the client
* MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert.
*/
if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len ||
( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
if( len > 5 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
}
#endif
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
/*
* Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
uint16_t dtls_legacy_version;
unsigned char cookie_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
/* Check that there is enough room for:
* - 2 bytes of version
* - 1 byte of cookie_len
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/*
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
* } HelloVerifyRequest;
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
dtls_legacy_version = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( p, 0 );
p += 2;
/*
* Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (0xfeff)
* The DTLS 1.3 (current draft) renames ProtocolVersion server_version to
* legacy_version and locks the value of legacy_version to 0xfefd (DTLS 1.2)
*/
if( dtls_legacy_version != 0xfefd && dtls_legacy_version != 0xfeff )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
cookie_len = *p++;
if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->cookie );
ssl->handshake->cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len );
if( ssl->handshake->cookie == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
memcpy( ssl->handshake->cookie, p, cookie_len );
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len;
/* Start over at ClientHello */
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl );
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret, i;
size_t n;
size_t ext_len;
unsigned char *buf, *ext;
unsigned char comp;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
#endif
int handshake_failure = 0;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
/* No alert on a read error. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
buf = ssl->in_msg;
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
{
ssl->renego_records_seen++;
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) );
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
{
if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
}
else
{
/* We made it through the verification process */
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->cookie );
ssl->handshake->cookie = NULL;
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/*
* 0 . 1 server_version
* 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
* 34 . 34 session_id length = n
* 35 . 34+n session_id
* 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite
* 37+n . 37+n compression_method
*
* 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional)
* 40+n . .. extensions
*/
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf, 2 );
ssl->tls_version = mbedtls_ssl_read_version( buf, ssl->conf->transport );
ssl->session_negotiate->tls_version = ssl->tls_version;
if( ssl->tls_version < ssl->conf->min_tls_version ||
ssl->tls_version > ssl->conf->max_tls_version )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "server version out of bounds - min: [0x%x], server: [0x%x], max: [0x%x]",
(unsigned)ssl->conf->min_tls_version,
(unsigned)ssl->tls_version,
(unsigned)ssl->conf->max_tls_version ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) |
( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) |
( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) |
( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) );
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
n = buf[34];
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
if( n > 32 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n )
{
ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[39 + n] ) );
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
}
else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n )
{
ext_len = 0;
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/* ciphersuite (used later) */
i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n];
/*
* Read and check compression
*/
comp = buf[37 + n];
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
}
/*
* Initialize update checksum functions
*/
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
/*
* Check if the session can be resumed
*/
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 ||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
#endif
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i ||
ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp ||
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
{
ssl->state++;
ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#endif
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n );
}
else
{
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d",
buf[37 + n] ) );
/*
* Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello.
*/
i = 0;
while( 1 )
{
if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i] == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[i++] ==
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite )
{
break;
}
}
suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite );
if( mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ssl, suite_info, ssl->tls_version,
ssl->tls_version ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
}
#endif
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
ext = buf + 40 + n;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) );
while( ext_len )
{
unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 )
| ( ext[1] ) );
unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 )
| ( ext[3] ) );
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
switch( ext_id )
{
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
#endif
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4,
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl,
ext + 4,
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl,
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) );
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
break;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) );
}
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
ext += 4 + ext_size;
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
}
/*
* mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the
* extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in
* case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension.
*/
if( ssl->handshake->resume )
{
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( ret );
}
}
/*
* Renegotiation security checks
*/
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
handshake_failure = 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
size_t dhm_actual_bitlen;
/*
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
*
* struct {
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
* } ServerDHParams;
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_dhm_get_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx );
if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u",
dhm_actual_bitlen,
ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
uint16_t tls_id;
size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
uint8_t ecpoint_len;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/*
* struct {
* ECParameters curve_params;
* ECPoint public;
* } ServerECDHParams;
*
* 1 curve_type (must be "named_curve")
* 2..3 NamedCurve
* 4 ECPoint.len
* 5+ ECPoint contents
*/
if( end - *p < 4 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
/* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */
if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
/* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */
tls_id = *(*p)++;
tls_id <<= 8;
tls_id |= *(*p)++;
/* Check it's a curve we offered */
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( ssl, tls_id ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve): %u",
(unsigned) tls_id ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
/* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */
if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type =
mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
handshake->ecdh_bits = ecdh_bits;
/* Keep a copy of the peer's public key */
ecpoint_len = *(*p)++;
if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
if( ecpoint_len > sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
memcpy( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey, *p, ecpoint_len );
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = ecpoint_len;
*p += ecpoint_len;
return( 0 );
}
#else
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
#else
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
#endif
curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
if( curve_info == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) );
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
/*
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
*
* struct {
* ECParameters curve_params;
* ECPoint public;
* } ServerECDHParams;
*/
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
(const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
uint16_t len;
((void) ssl);
/*
* PSK parameters:
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( end - (*p) < 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( end - (*p) < len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/*
* Note: we currently ignore the PKS identity hint, as we only allow one
* PSK to be provisionned on the client. This could be changed later if
* someone needs that feature.
*/
*p += len;
ret = 0;
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
/*
* Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t offset, size_t *olen,
size_t pms_offset )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t len_bytes = 2;
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
/*
* Generate (part of) the pre-master as
* struct {
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
* opaque random[46];
* } PreMasterSecret;
*/
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( p, ssl->conf->transport,
MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 );
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* Now write it out, encrypted
*/
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk,
p, ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen,
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( len_bytes == 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen, ssl->out_msg, offset );
*olen += 2;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char **p,
unsigned char *end,
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg )
{
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
*pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
if( (*p) + 2 > end )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
/*
* Get hash algorithm
*/
if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) )
== MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
/*
* Get signature algorithm
*/
if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) )
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
/*
* Check if the signature algorithm is acceptable
*/
if( !mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered( ssl, MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( *p, 0 ) ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0] ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d",
(*p)[1] ) );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d",
(*p)[0] ) );
*p += 2;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
* enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
size_t olen = 0;
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, peer_key->grp.id ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE );
}
ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type =
PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR( mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa( peer_key->grp.id,
&ecdh_bits ) );
if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_type == 0 || ecdh_bits > 0xffff )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Invalid ecc group conversion to psa." ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
ssl->handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits;
/* Store peer's public key in psa format. */
ret = mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( &peer_key->grp, &peer_key->Q,
MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &olen,
ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH );
if ( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len = olen;
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE );
}
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
* operations like ECDHE. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
((void) p);
((void) end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing )
{
goto start_processing;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
{
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
/* Current message is probably either
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing;
start_processing:
#endif
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
} /* FALLTHROUGH */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
; /* nothing more to do */
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
{
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
p, end - p );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
#else
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
#endif
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
*/
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
if( pk_alg !=
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
}
/*
* Read signature
*/
if( p > end - 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
p += 2;
if( p != end - sig_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
/*
* Compute the hash that has been signed
*/
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
{
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
params, params_len,
md_alg );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
{
/* Should never happen */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*
* Verify signature
*/
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
* operations like ECDHE. */
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
exit:
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
unsigned char *buf;
size_t n = 0;
size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
size_t sig_alg_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
unsigned char *sig_alg;
unsigned char *dn;
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
ssl->state++;
ssl->handshake->client_auth =
( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request",
ssl->handshake->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) );
if( ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 )
{
/* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
goto exit;
}
/*
* struct {
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
* supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
* } CertificateRequest;
*
* Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
* ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
* certificate.
*
* We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
* if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
* and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
* the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
*
* Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
* point we only have one hash available (see comments in
* write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have.
*
* However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
* superficially sane.
*/
buf = ssl->in_msg;
/* certificate_types */
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
n = cert_type_len;
/*
* In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf:
* * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
* SSL is 3),
* * distinguished name length otherwise.
* Both reach at most the index:
* ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
* therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
* regardless of the actual code path.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
/* supported_signature_algorithms */
sig_alg_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
/*
* The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below:
* sig_alg[i + 1],
* where:
* sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n,
* max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1.
* Therefore the furthest access is:
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1],
* which reduces to:
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len],
* which is one less than we need the buf to be.
*/
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n + sig_alg_len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n;
for( size_t i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d",
sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) );
}
#endif
n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
/* certificate_authorities */
dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
n += dn_len;
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
dn = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n - dn_len;
for( size_t i = 0, dni_len = 0; i < dn_len; i += 2 + dni_len )
{
unsigned char *p = dn + i + 2;
mbedtls_x509_name name;
mbedtls_x509_name *name_cur, *name_prv;
size_t asn1_len;
char s[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
memset( &name, 0, sizeof( name ) );
dni_len = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT16_BE( dn + i, 0 );
if( dni_len > dn_len - i - 2 ||
mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, p + dni_len, &asn1_len,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) != 0 ||
mbedtls_x509_get_name( &p, p + asn1_len, &name ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
( "DN hint: %.*s",
mbedtls_x509_dn_gets( s, sizeof(s), &name ), s ) );
name_cur = name.next;
while( name_cur != NULL )
{
name_prv = name_cur;
name_cur = name_cur->next;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( name_prv, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_name ) );
mbedtls_free( name_prv );
}
}
#endif
exit:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) );
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
size_t header_len;
size_t content_len;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
{
/*
* DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
*/
content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4 );
header_len = 6;
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ),
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
header_len = 4;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
/*
* Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
*/
/* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
* applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
* the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
* such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
* yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
* For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
* of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
/* Generate ECDH private key. */
status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
&handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
* The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
* but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
unsigned char *own_pubkey = ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1;
unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( end - own_pubkey );
size_t own_pubkey_len;
status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
&own_pubkey_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
}
ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
/* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */
/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ),
&ssl->handshake->pmslen );
destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
#else
/*
* ECDH key exchange -- send client public value
*/
header_len = 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
goto ecdh_calc_secret;
mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
}
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&content_len,
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len;
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
}
ecdh_calc_secret:
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
/*
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
/* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
* and we check that the server's choice is among the
* ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
/* uint16 to store content length */
const size_t content_len_size = 2;
header_len = 4;
if( header_len + content_len_size + ssl->conf->psk_identity_len
> MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + header_len;
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
header_len += content_len_size;
memcpy( p, ssl->conf->psk_identity,
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
p += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
/*
* Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
*/
/* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
* applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
* the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
* such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
* yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
* For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
* of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
/* Generate ECDH private key. */
status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
&handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA.
* The export format is an ECPoint structure as expected by TLS,
* but we just need to add a length byte before that. */
unsigned char *own_pubkey = p + 1;
unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t own_pubkey_max_len = (size_t)( end - own_pubkey );
size_t own_pubkey_len = 0;
status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
own_pubkey, own_pubkey_max_len,
&own_pubkey_len );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
}
*p = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_len;
content_len = own_pubkey_len + 1;
/* As RFC 5489 section 2, the premaster secret is formed as follows:
* - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the ECDH computation
* - the octet string produced by the ECDH computation
* - a uint16 containing the length (in octets) of the PSK
* - the PSK itself
*/
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
const unsigned char* const pms_end = pms +
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
/* uint16 to store length (in octets) of the ECDH computation */
const size_t zlen_size = 2;
size_t zlen = 0;
/* Perform ECDH computation after the uint16 reserved for the length */
status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
pms + zlen_size,
pms_end - ( pms + zlen_size ),
&zlen );
destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( status ) );
else if( destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls( destruction_status ) );
/* Write the ECDH computation length before the ECDH computation */
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( zlen, pms, 0 );
pms += zlen_size + zlen;
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
/*
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
{
/* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
* and we check that the server's choice is among the
* ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
header_len = 4;
content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len,
ssl->conf->psk_identity,
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
{
content_len = 0;
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
&content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
{
/*
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
*/
content_len = mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx );
if( header_len + 2 + content_len >
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
}
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
(int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx ),
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster;
unsigned char *pms_end = pms + sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster );
size_t pms_len;
/* Write length only when we know the actual value */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
pms + 2, pms_end - ( pms + 2 ), &pms_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( pms_len, pms, 0 );
pms += 2 + pms_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
#endif
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
{
/*
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
*/
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&content_len,
&ssl->out_msg[header_len],
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
}
else
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO && MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
"mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
{
header_len = 4;
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
&content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
header_len = 4;
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
ssl->out_msg + header_len,
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
&content_len,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
return( ret );
}
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
return( ret );
}
}
else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
{
((void) ciphersuite_info);
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client key exchange" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
unsigned char hash[48];
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
size_t hashlen;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t out_buf_len = ssl->out_buf_len - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf );
#else
size_t out_buf_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN - ( ssl->out_msg - ssl->out_buf );
#endif
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
{
goto sign;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ssl->handshake->client_auth == 0 ||
mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
}
/*
* Make a signature of the handshake digests
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
sign:
#endif
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen );
/*
* digitally-signed struct {
* opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
* };
*
* Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the
* PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature
* algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message.
*
* Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this
* shortcut.
*
* Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and
* SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server
* side.
*/
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;
}
else
{
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256;
}
ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
hashlen = 0;
offset = 2;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset,
out_buf_len - 6 - offset,
&n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4 );
ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset;
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
ssl->state++;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
uint32_t lifetime;
size_t ticket_len;
unsigned char *ticket;
const unsigned char *msg;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
/*
* struct {
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
* } NewSessionTicket;
*
* 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint
* 4 . 5 ticket_len (n)
* 6 . 5+n ticket content
*/
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) );
/* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
/*
* Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
* to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
*/
if( ticket_len == 0 )
return( 0 );
if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
{
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
ssl->session->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
}
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) );
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len );
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
/*
* RFC 5077 section 3.4:
* "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
* discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) );
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) );
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
/*
* SSL handshake -- client side -- single step
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = 0;
/* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
* by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
{
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
}
#endif
switch( ssl->state )
{
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
break;
/*
* ==> ClientHello
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_client_hello( ssl );
break;
/*
* <== ServerHello
* Certificate
* ( ServerKeyExchange )
* ( CertificateRequest )
* ServerHelloDone
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl );
break;
/*
* ==> ( Certificate/Alert )
* ClientKeyExchange
* ( CertificateVerify )
* ChangeCipherSpec
* Finished
*/
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
break;
/*
* <== ( NewSessionTicket )
* ChangeCipherSpec
* Finished
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl );
break;
#endif
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
break;
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
break;
default:
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
}
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
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